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When tariffs were reduced in the period following the initial GATT agreement, anti-dumping duties were increasingly introduced and the inadequacy of Article VI to frame their introduction became increasingly evident. For example, Article VI requires that the harm of material interest be established, but provides no indication of the existence of such harm and deals with the method of determining the existence of dumping only in the most general way. As a result, the GATT contracting parties negotiated more detailed anti-dumping codes. The first code, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, came into force in 1967 following the Kennedy Round. However, the United States never signed the Kennedy Round Code, and as a result the code had little practical importance. The Tokyo Round Code, which came into force in 1980, has taken a leap forward. On the merits, it provided much more information on the determination of dumping and harm than Article VI. It is equally important that it essentially sets out certain procedural and procedural requirements that must be met in the conduct of investigations. Nevertheless, the code has always been only a general framework for countries to follow in the investigation and collection of tariffs. It was also marked by ambiguities on many contentious issues and was limited by the fact that only the 27 parties to the code were related to its requirements. 6.7 In order to verify the information transmitted or to obtain further details, the authorities may, if necessary, carry out investigations on the territory of other members, provided that the companies concerned are obtained and informed by the representatives of the government of the member concerned, and unless that member objects to the investigation.

The procedures described in Schedule I apply to investigations carried out on the territory of other Members. Subject to the obligation to protect confidential information, the authorities make the results of these investigations available to the companies to which they belong, or transmit them in accordance with paragraph 9, and may make it available to applicants. 6.1.1 Foreign exporters or producers who receive questionnaires as part of the anti-dumping investigation procedure must be mentioned in response for at least 30 days. (15) Any request for an extension of the 30-day period should be properly reviewed and, where possible, this extension should be granted for proven reasons. 6.10.2 In cases where the authorities have limited their review in accordance with this paragraph, they nevertheless set an individual dumping margin for each un retained exporter or producer, which provides the necessary information in a timely manner for this information to be verified during the investigation, unless the number of exporters or producers is large enough for individual audits to be too heavy for the authorities and the investigation is completed in time. useful.